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Abstract
Which rates should we use to discount costs and benefits of different natures
at different time horizons? We answer this question by considering a repre-
sentative agent consuming two goods whose availability evolves over time in a
stochastic way. We extend the Ramsey rule by taking into account the degree
of substitutability between the two goods and of the uncertainty surrounding
the economic and environmental growths. The rate at which environmental
impacts should be discounted is in general different from the one at which
monetary benefits should be discounted. We provide arguments in favor of
an ecological discount rate smaller than the economic discount rate. In par-
ticular, we show that, under certainty and Cobb-Douglas preferences, the
difference between the economic and the ecological discount rates equals the
difference between the economic and the ecological growth rates. Using data
about the link between biodiversity and economic development, I estimate
that the rate at which changes in biodiversity should be discounted is 1.5%,
whereas changes in consumption should be discounted at 3.2%.
Keywords: Discounting, Ramsey rule, bivariate utility function, pru-
dence, sustainable development.
JEL Classification: G12, E43, Q51
1 Introduction
The current debate on the intensity of the global effort to fight climate change
has focused much on the choice of the discount rate, which is crucial to an-
swer this question because of the long term nature of the impacts of the
reduction of emissions of most greenhouse gases. Since Ramsey (1928), we
know that the main economic justification of discounting is based on a wealth
effect. If one believes that future generations will be wealthier than us, one
more unit of consumption is more valuable to us than to them, under de-
creasing marginal utility of consumption. However, a large fraction of the
impacts of climate change affects the quality of the environment (increased
temperature, reduced biodiversity, or destruction of environmental assets for
example) rather than consumption. In this paper, we address the question of
how one should discount future changes in the quality of the environment. If
we believe that the environment is deteriorating over time, and if we assume
that the marginal utility of the quality of the environment is decreasing,
then increasing the environmental quality is more valuable to future genera-
tions than to us. This argument, which is symmetric to the Ramsey’s wealth
effect, is in favour of using a smaller discount rate for changes in the envi-
ronment than for changes in consumption. The full characterization of this
”ecological” discount rate should also take into account of the substitutabil-
ity between environmental assets and consumption, and of the uncertainty
that affects the dynamics of consumption and of the environment. This pa-
per provides a full description of the determinants of the ecological discount
rate.
There are two possible methods to evaluate the present monetary value
of a sure future environmental impact. The classical one consists in first mea-
suring the future monetary value of the impact, and second discounting this
monetary equivalent impact to the present. This involves a pricing formula
to value future changes in environmental quality, and an economic discount
rate to discount these monetarized impacts. As first suggested by Malinvaud
(1953), the second approach consists in first discounting the future environ-
mental impact to transform it into an immediate equivalent environmental
impact, and then measuring the monetary value of this immediate impact.
This involves an ecological discount rate, to discount environmental impacts.
Of course, these two methods are strictly equivalent. As shown by Guesnerie
(2004), Weikard and Zhu (2005) and Hoel and Sterner (2007) in the case of
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certainty, the two discount rates differ if the monetary value of environmental
assets evolves over time.
The classical method is not well adapted to the case of uncertainty. In-
deed, the value of environmental assets in the future depends upon their
relative scarcity, which is unknown. This is a problem because the economic
discount rate is useful to discount sure future monetary benefits. Because the
monetary value of environmental impacts is uncertain, one needs to compute
its certainty equivalent. This requires the use of a stochastic discount fac-
tor, which determines at the same time the risk premium and the economic
discount rate. Standard pricing formulas exist that can be borrowed from
the theory of finance, but they are seldom used in cost-benefit analyses of
environmental projects because of their complexity. In this paper, we follow
the alternative methods based on the ecological discount rate. The ecologi-
cal discount factor associated to date t is the immediate sure environmental
impact that has the same impact on intergenerational welfare than a unit
environmental impact at date t. The (shadow) price of an immediate envi-
ronmental impact can then be used to value environmental projects. This
alternative method is simpler because one does not need to compute certainty
equivalent future values.
The efficient economic (resp. ecological) discount rate equals the marginal
rate of substitution between future and present consumption (resp. environ-
mental qualities). If the quality of the environment improves with time, and
if the marginal utility of the quality of the environment is decreasing, this
environmental growth effect justifies a positive ecological discount rate. On
the contrary, if one believes that the quality of the environment will deteri-
orate over time, a negative ecological discount rate may be socially efficient.
However, assuming that consumption is a substitute to the quality of the en-
vironment, economic growth has a positive impact on the ecological discount
rate, thereby potentially counterbalancing the effect of the deterioration of
the environment. As observed for example by Traeger (2007), the possibility
to substitute the deteriorating environment quality by other goods is at the
core of the notion of sustainable development. If the substitutability is lim-
ited, the environmental deterioration effect dominates the economic growth
effect, and the ecological discount rate should be small or negative, thereby
inducing us to preserve environmental assets.
FollowingWeitzman (2007) and Gollier (2002, 2007), we consider a consumption-
based theory of discount rates under uncertainty. Uncertainty adds new ele-
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ments into the picture. Besides the growth effect and the substitution effect,
there is a precautionary effect. The uncertainty associated to the future qual-
ity of the environment reduces the ecological rate if the marginal utility of
the environment is convex in it. As explained in the paper, other third deriv-
atives of the bivariate utility function also play a role in the determination
of the ecological discount rate if the economic growth is uncertain.
Our analysis exhibits two arguments in favor of using an ecological dis-
count rate smaller than the economic discount rate. Under certainty, we
show that the difference between the economic and the ecological discount
rates equals the difference between the economic and the ecological growth
rates. A first argument is thus derived from the hypothesis that the growth
of environmental quality is smaller than the economic growth. A second ar-
gument is based on the hypothesis that there is more uncertainty about the
evolution of the environmental quality than on the evolution of the economy.
The precautionary argument, which tends to reduce the discount rate, is thus
stronger for the ecological discount rate.
An important question is to determine whether the ecological and the
economic discount rates should be sensitive to the time horizon. Weitz-
man (2007) and Gollier (2007) have justified a decreasing term structure of
the economic rate based on a learning effect in a model in which there is
some parametric uncertainty affecting the growth process. We show that a
similar result holds for the ecological discount rate in a model with a multi-
attribute utility function when the sensitiveness of the environmental quality
to changes in GDP per capita is uncertain. We believe that this argument is
particularly relevant for the ecological discount rate, because of the consid-
erable parametric uncertainty underlying the evolution of the quality of the
environment.
Section 2 describes the intuitive assumptions that one needs to consider
on preferences to sign the various determinants of the ecological discount rate:
risk aversion, correlation aversion, prudence and cross-prudence. In section
3, we derive the pricing formulas for the economic and ecological discount
rates. The 5 determinants of the ecological discount rate are described in
Section 4, whereas Section 5 is devoted to the special case of the CES utility
function under certainty. In Section 6, we derive an analytical solution to
the ecological discount rate when the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, and
the uncertainty is described by a bivariate brownian motion. From this
benchmark, we explore various extensions, in particular the case of the more
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general CES utility function under uncertainty, or the case of parametric
uncertainty.
2 The basic preference concepts
We consider a simple aggregate model with two goods. The first one is an
aggregate consumption good, whereas the second one is an aggregate environ-
mental good. The latter can be seen as a quality index of the environment,
which includes the comfort generated from the climate, the services extracted
from the biodiversity, the morbidity due to various pollutions, or the life ex-
pectancy for example. Discounting future costs and benefits in the context
of two goods is driven by specific preference traits of the representative agent
which are described in this section.
Variables x1t and x2t denote respectively the quantity of the consumption
good consumed by the representative agent at date t, and the quality of the
environment at that date. Let li > 0 and εi denote respectively any sure loss
in xi and any zero-mean risk in xi, i = 1, 2. I assume that the representative
agent is averse to consumption risks and to environmental risks, which means
that for all (x1, x2) and all zero-mean risks (ε1, ε2):
(x1, x2) % (x1 + ε1, x2)
(x1, x2) % (x1, x2 + ε2).
In various parts of the paper, we consider the following additional atemporal
definitions on collective preferences:
• The representative agent is correlation-averse if he always prefers a 50-
50 gamble of a loss in consumption or a loss in environmental quality
over another 50-50 gamble offering a loss in neither dimension or a loss
in both:
((x1−l1, x2), 1/2; (x1, x2−l2), 1/2) % ((x1, x2), 1/2; (x1−l1, x2−l2), 1/2).
• The representative agent is prudent in consumption (environment) if
risk in consumption (environment) can be tempered by a sure increase
in consumption (environment). More precisely, prudence in consump-
tion means that one always prefers a 50-50 gamble of a zero-mean risk
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in consumption or of a sure loss in consumption over a 50-50 gam-
ble with nothing in one state, or the zero-mean risk in consumption
combined with the sure loss in consumption in the other state:
((x1+ε1, x2), 1/2; (x1−l1, x2), 1/2) % ((x1, x2), 1/2; (x1+ε1−l1, x2), 1/2).
Prudence in environmental quality is easily defined by symmetry:
((x1, x2+ε2), 1/2; (x1, x2−l2), 1/2) % ((x1, x2), 1/2; (x1, x2+ε2−l2), 1/2).
• The representative agent is cross-prudent if risk in one dimension can
be tempered by a sure increase in the other dimension. Namely, cross-
prudence in consumption means that one always prefers a 50-50 gamble
of a zero-mean risk in consumption or a sure loss in environmental
quality over a 50-50 gamble with nothing in one state, or the zero-
mean risk in consumption combined with the sure loss in environmental
quality in the other state:
((x1+ε1, x2), 1/2; (x1, x2−l2), 1/2) % ((x1, x2), 1/2; (x1+ε1, x2−l2), 1/2).
Symmetrically, cross-prudence in environmental quality is defined as
follows:
((x1, x2+ε2), 1/2; (x1−l1, x2), 1/2) % ((x1, x2), 1/2; (x1−l1, x2+ε2), 1/2).
Because a sure loss and a zero-mean risk are two ”harms” for risk-averse
agents, one can summarize the above definitions by saying that the repre-
sentative agent always prefer to incur one of the two harms for certain, with
the only uncertainty being about which one will be received, as opposed to a
50-50 gamble of receiving the two harms simultaneously, or receiving neither.
Following a terminology introduced by Kimball (1993) and Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006), pairs of harms are ”mutually aggravating”.
We hereafter assume that the representative agent is an expected-utility
maximizer. His preferences are represented by a three times differentiable
and increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U : R2 → R. In
that framework, risk aversion means that U is concave in both dimensions.
Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007) have shown that the concepts of
correlation aversion, prudence and cross-prudence are easy to characterize in
this framework. We summarize their findings in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 (Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger) In the expected utility frame-
work with a bivariate utility function U, the different concepts of mutually
aggravating harms are characterized by the sign of different derivatives of
U :
1. U is correlation-averse if and only if U12 is non-positive;
2. U is prudent in consumption (environmental quality) if and only if U111
(U222) is non-negative;
3. U is cross-prudent in consumption (environmental quality) if and only
if U112 (U122) is non-negative.
We hereafter assume that this conditions are satisfied by the representa-
tive agent’s preferences.
3 A model for efficient discount rates
At date t = 0, the representative agent evaluates actions by using the follow-
ing utilitarian social welfare function:
V = E
∙Z ∞
0
e−δtU(x1t, x2t)dt
¸
, (1)
where δ is an ethical parameter valuing future utils relative to current ones,
and where E is the expectation operator that takes into account the fact
that the pair (x1t, x2t) is uncertain at date t = 0. The representative agent
contemplates the possibility to sacrifice some current utility either to increase
consumption at date t or to improve environmental quality at that date.
The first problem refers to the choice of the economic discount rate, which
discounts future consumption. The second problem refers to the choice of the
ecological discount rate, which discounts future changes in the environmental
quality.
We first examine the economic discount rate. Let us consider a simple
marginal project that would increase consumption by a sure amount ε in
period [t, t + ∆t], and that would reduce consumption by εe−r(t)t in period
[0,∆t], leaving the environment unaffected by the action. We assume that
ε and ∆t tend to zero. Observe that this simple project has a sure internal
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rate of return r(t). Implementing this marginal project would increase social
welfare if £
−e−r(t)tU1(x10, x20) + e−δtEU1(x1t, x2t)
¤
ε∆t ≥ 0,
or equivalently, if
r(t) ≥ r1(t) = δ −
1
t
ln
EU1(x1t, x2t)
U1(x10, x20)
. (2)
In other words, the internal rate of return of the project must exceed a
minimum threshold, r1(t), to be socially efficient. Thus, r1(t) defined by
equation 2 is the socially efficient economic discount rate associated to time
horizon t. It allows for the comparison of the value of different consumption
increments at different dates.
Consider alternatively an investment project that increases the environ-
mental quality by ε in period [t, t + ∆t]. The standard way to include this
environmental impact in the cost-benefit analysis would be to first express
this impact in future monetary terms. The instantaneous value vt of the en-
vironment at date t is measured by the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and the environment:
vt = −
dx1t
dx2t
¯¯¯¯
U
=
U2(x1t, x2t)
U1(x1t, x2t)
. (3)
If the quality of the environment would be traded, vt would be its equilibrium
price, taking the aggregate consumption good as the numeraire. More gener-
ally, vt is the instantaneous willingness to pay for improving environmental
quality. Its evolution over time is uncertain, i.e., vt is a random variable seen
from t = 0. So is the future monetary benefit εvt of the sure improvement
of the environmental quality. Its certainty equivalent is
CEt = ε
EvtU1(x1t, x2t)
EU1(x1t, x2t)
.
CEt is the sure increase in consumption at date t that has the same effect on
welfare as an ε increase in environmental quality at date t, seen from date
0. It would be the equilibrium future price P f of an asset traded at date
0 that delivers one unit of the environmental good with certainty at date t
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against the payment of P f at that date. This certainty equivalent must then
be discounted at the economic discount rate r1(t) to measure the net present
monetary value of a sure future improvement of the environment.
A much simpler approach is obtained by defining an ecological discount
rate. Consider a marginal project that would increase the environmental
quality by a sure amount ε in period [t, t +∆t], and that would reduce the
environmental quality by εe−r(t)t in period [0,∆t]. Implementing this project
would be socially efficient if
r(t) ≥ r2(t) = δ −
1
t
ln
EU2(x1t, x2t)
U2(x10, x20)
. (4)
This equation defines the ecological discount rate r2(t) associated to time
horizon t. It allows us to compare sure changes in the environment quality
at different dates. Namely, an increase in environmental quality by ε at date
t has an effect on intertemporal welfare that is equivalent to an increase in
current environmental quality by εe−r2(t)t. In monetary terms, this is equal
to v0εe−r2(t)t.
The two methods value the environmental impact in the same way, since
e−r1(t)tCEt = e−δt
EU2(x1t, x2t)
U1(x10, x20)
= v0e−r2(t)t.
To sum up, the benefit of a unit increment in environmental quality at
date t should be accounted for in the evaluation of a project as equivalent
to an immediate increase in consumption by v0e−r2(t)t. This really means
that environmental costs and benefits should be discounted at the ecological
rate r2(t), which needs not to be the same as the economic discount rate
r1(t). The potential discrepancy between the economic discount rate and
the ecological discount rate takes into account the stochastic changes in the
relative social valuation of the environment.
4 The determinants of the ecological discount
rate
In this section, we describe the five determinants of the ecological discount
rate. We compare two economies, j = a or b, having the same representative
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agent characterized by (δ, U), and the same initial economic and ecological
environment (x10, x20). They differ by their expectations on economic and
ecological growths. Let F j1 and F
j
2 denote respectively the marginal distrib-
utions of xj1t and x
j
2t. In order to guarantee the existence of expectations, we
hereafter suppose that the supports of x1t and x2t are bounded.
We first examine the role of the expectations on the growth of environ-
mental quality. In the following definition and proposition, we assume that
the prospects of economic growth are the same in the two economies. The
following definition is based on the classical two stochastic dominance orders
applied to the conditional distributions of x2t.1
Definition 1 (Ecological Dominance) Consider two economies, j = a or b,
with the same the marginal distributions of x1t: F a1 ≡ F b1 .
1. We say that economy b is ecologically dominated by economy a in the
sense of first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) if xb2t | xb1t = y1 is
FSD-dominated by xa2t | xa1t = y1 for all y1.
2. We say that economy b is ecologically riskier than economy a if xb2t |
xb1t = y1 is riskier than xa2t | xa1t = y1 in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz
(1970) for all y1.
A first-degree ecologically dominated shift is obtained when all condi-
tional distributions of environmental quality are shifted downwards, condi-
tional to all possible economic outcomes x1t = y1. An example of an increase
in ecological riskiness is when each conditional distribution of environmental
quality undergoes a mean-preserving spread, as defined by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970). The following proposition characterizes the conditions under
which such changes in beliefs reduce the ecological discount rate.
Proposition 2 Consider any pair of economies with the same marginal dis-
tributions of economic outcome x1t: F a1 ≡ F b1 .
1Let F j2|1 be the distribution of x
j
2t | xj1t. As is well-known, xb2t | xb1t = y1 is FSD-
dominated by xa2t | xa1t = y1 if F a2|1(y1, y2) ≤ F b2|1(y1, y2) for all y2. Similarly, xb2t | xb1t = y1
is riskier than xa2t | xa1t = y1 in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz if
R y2 F a2|1(y1, z)dz ≤ R y2
F b2|1(y1, z)dz for all y2, with an equality for y2 being the supremum of the support of x
b
2t.
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1. (ecological growth effect) Suppose that economy b is ecologically
dominated by economy a in the sense of first-degree stochastic domi-
nance. The ecological discount rate is smaller in economy b than in
economy a if and only if U2 is non-increasing in x2.
2. (ecological prudence effect) Suppose that economy b is ecologically
riskier than economy a. The ecological discount rate is smaller in econ-
omy b than in economy a if and only if U2 is convex in x2.
Proof: We start with the proof of claim 1. Because economy b is eco-
logically dominated by economy a in the sense of FSD, and because U2 is
decreasing in its second argument, we have that EU2(y1, xb2t | xb1t = y1) is
larger EU2(y1, xa2t | xa1t = y1) for all y1. It implies that
EU2(xb1, x
b
2) =
Z
EU2(y1, xb2t | xb1t = y1)dF b1 (y1)
≥
Z
EU2(y1, xa2t | xa1t = y1)dF a1 (y1) = EU2(xa1, xa2).
It implies that
rb2(t) = δ −
1
t
ln
EU2(xb1t, xb2t)
U2(x10, x20)
≤ δ − 1
t
ln
EU2(xa1t, xa2t)
U2(x10, x20)
= ra2(t).
This proves the sufficiency of U22 ≤ 0. To prove necessity, suppose by con-
tradiction that U22 is not uniformly negative. By continuity, there exists
(y1, y2) ∈ R2 and a neighborhood N ∈ R2 such that (y1, y2) ∈ N and U22 is
uniformly positive in N. Consider two economies a and b with the same mar-
ginal distribution of x1t and with a support of (x
j
1t, x
j
2t) entirely contained
in N . Because economy b is ecologically dominated by economy a in the
sense of FSD, and because U2 is increasing in x2 in the support of (x
j
1t, x
j
2t),
EU2(xb1, xb2) is smaller than EU2(xa1, xa2), which implies that rb2(t) is larger
than ra2(t). This is a contradiction. The proof of claim 2 is perfectly parallel,
and is therefore skipped. ¥
A FSD-deterioration of the ecological growth reduces the ecological dis-
count rate under the standard assumption that U is concave in x2. The
willingness to improve the environmental quality in the future is negatively
related to the expected future environmental quality. This ecological growth
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effect is parallel to the wealth effect that is apparent in the Ramsey rule. The
ecological prudence effect states that an increase in the uncertainty on the
future environmental quality reduces the ecological discount rate if U222 is
non-negative, i.e., if the representative agent is prudent in the environment
quality.
We now examine the role of the expectations on economic growth. The
ceteris paribus condition is hereafter that the expectations on the future
environmental quality are unchanged.
Definition 2 (Economic Dominance) Consider two economies, j = a or b,
with the same the marginal distributions of x2t: F a2 ≡ F b2 .
1. We say that economy b is economically dominated by economy a in the
sense of first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) if xb1t | xb2t = y2 is
FSD-dominated by xa1t | xa2t = y2 for all y2.
2. We say that economy b is economically riskier than economy a if xb1t |
xb2t = y2 is riskier than xa1t | xa2t = y2 in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz
(1970) for all y2.
Proposition 3 Consider any pair of economies with the same marginal dis-
tributions of environmental quality x2t: F a2 ≡ F b2 .
1. (substitution effect) Suppose that economy b is economically domi-
nated by economy a in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance.
The ecological discount rate is smaller in economy b than in economy
a if and only if U2 is non-increasing in x1.
2. (cross-prudence effect) Suppose that economy b is economically
riskier than economy a. The ecological discount rate is smaller in econ-
omy b than in economy a if and only if U2 is convex in x1.
Proof: The proof of this proposition is parallel to the proof of Proposition
2, and is therefore skipped. ¥
If the representative agent is correlation-averse, i.e., if U12 is non-positive,
a FSD-dominated shift in the expectations of economic growth reduces the
ecological discount rate. This substitution effect shows that the willingness
to invest in the environment is decreasing in the rate of economic growth
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under this condition. Similarly, under the assumption that the representa-
tive agent is cross-prudent in consumption (U211 ≥ 0), an increase in the
uncertainty surrounding the economic growth raises the willingness to invest
in the environment. It thus reduces the ecological discount rate.
Finally, we examine the effect of the correlation between ecological and
economic growth. We consider the following notion of statistical dependence.
Definition 3 (Correlation) Consider a pair of random variables (ex1t, ex2t).
We say that there is positive FSD dependence between ex1t and ex2t if any
increase in y1 yields a FSD-dominant shift in x2t | x1t = y1.
In other words, an increase in economic growth generates a first-order
stochastic dominant shift in the conditional distribution of the environmental
quality. In the statistical literature (see for example Joe (1997)), this notion
is referred to as the ”stochastic increasing positive dependence”, because x2t
is more likely to take on larger value when x1t increases. Milgrom (1981)
uses this concept to define the notion of a good news.
Let us compare two economies a and b with the same marginal distribu-
tions: F a1 ≡ F b1 and F a2 ≡ F b2 . In words, when considered in isolation, both
the economic risk and the ecological risk look the same in the two economies.
In the benchmark economy a, we assume that the two risks are independent,
whereas, in economy b, there is positive FSD dependence between them. How
does this positive statistical dependence affect the ecological discount rate?
Because it tends to raise the global risk, it should intuitively reduce the dis-
count rates. This is the case if EU2(x1t, x2t) is increased by the positive FSD
dependence of x1t and x2t. As shown in the following proposition, this is the
case if and only if U2 is supermodular, i.e., if U122 is positive.
Proposition 4 (Correlation effect) Consider two economies with the same
marginal distributions for x1t and x2t: F a1 ≡ F b1 and F a2 ≡ F b2 . In econ-
omy a, the two random variables are independent, whereas they are positive
FSD-dependent in economy b. Then, the ecological discount rate is smaller
in economy b than in economy a if and only if the representative agent is
cross-prudent in environmental quality (U122 positive).
Proof: Tchen (1980) and Gollier (2007) proved that Eh(x1t, x2t) is in-
creased by positive FSD-dependence if and only if function h is supermodu-
lar. Applying this to function h = U2 implies that EU2 is increased by the
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positive statistical dependence under scrutinty if and only if U122 is positive.
¥
The three propositions presented in this section characterize the 5 deter-
minants of the ecological discount rate. A symmetric analysis can be made
about the economic discount rate r1(t).
5 CES utility in the certainty case
Guesnerie (2004), Hoel and Sterner (2007), Sterner and Persson (2008) and
Traeger (2007) considered the case of certainty, which implies that the only
determinants at play for the ecological discount rate are the ecological growth
effect and the substitution effect. They examined the following set of CES
functions:
U(x1, x2) =
1
1− αy
1−α with y =
h
(1− γ)x
σ−1
σ
1 + γx
σ−1
σ
2
i σ
σ−1
, (5)
where σ > 0 is the constant elasticity of substitution, α > 0 is relative
aversion towards the risk on ”aggregate good” y, and γ ∈ [0, 1] is a preference
weight in favor of the environment. Parameter σ is the rate at which the
demand for x2 declines when the relative price of x2 is increased by 1%. This
function is defined on R2+. We have that
U2(x1, x2) = γy
1
σ−αx−
1
σ
2 .
From this expression, we see that the representative agent is correlation-
averse (U12 ≤ 0) if and only if ασ−1 is nonnegative. Thus, from Proposition
3.1, we know that the ecological discount rate is increasing with the economic
growth rate if ασ − 1 is nonnegative. We also observe that this condition
is sufficient for aversion to ecological risk (U22 ≤ 0). Thus, from Property 1
of Proposition 2., this condition is sufficient for the ecological discount rate
to be increasing with the growth rate of environmental quality. To make
this more explicit, suppose that growth rates are constant, which means that
x1t = eg1t and x2t = eg2t. The following equation is a direct rewriting of
equation (4) under this specification:
r2(t) = δ +
g2
σ
+
µ
α− 1
σ
¶
G(t) (6)
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with
G(t) =
σ
σ − 1
1
t
ln
h
(1− γ)eg1 σ−1σ t + γeg2 σ−1σ t
i
.
We directly obtain the following proposition. Some of these results are in
Guesnerie (2004) and Hoel and Sterner (2007).
Proposition 5 Suppose that xi grows at a constant rate gi, i = 1, 2, and
that the utility function satisfies (5). Then, the ecological discount rate r2(t)
1. is increasing in the economic growth rate g1 if and only if ασ − 1 is
nonnegative;
2. is increasing in the ecological growth rate g2 if ασ − 1 is nonnegative;
3. is decreasing with the time horizon t if and only if (ασ − 1)(1 − σ) is
positive;
4. tends to r20 = δ + g2σ + (α−
1
σ )((1− γ)g1 + γg2) when t tends to zero;
5. tends to
r2∞ =
½
δ + g2σ + (α−
1
σ )min(g1, g2) if σ < 1
δ + g2σ + (α−
1
σ )max(g1, g2) if σ > 1
when t tends to infinity.
Proof: Properties 1 and 2 have already been proved above. Property 3
comes from the observation that eG(t) is the certainty equivalent of (eg1, 1−
γ; eg2, γ) under utility function vt(z) = σ−1σ z
σ−1
σ t, which is increasing, and
whose Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion is increasing (decreasing) in
t when σ is smaller (larger) than unity. By the main theorem in Pratt
(1964), this implies that the certainty equivalent G(t) is decreasing (increas-
ing) in t when σ is smaller (larger) than unity. Equation (6) concludes the
proof of property 3. Properties 4 and 5 are direct consequences of applying
L’Hospital’s rule to the limits of r2(t) when t tends to zero and infinity. ¥
The most interesting result described in the above proposition is property
3, which states that the term structure of the ecological discount rate should
be decreasing if (ασ − 1)(1 − σ) is positive. The intuition of this result
is easiest to understand by assuming that the environment remains stable
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(g2 = 0), as in Guesnerie (2004). In that case, only the substitution effect is
at play, and it is easy to check that equations (4) simplifies to
r2(t) = δ + g1
R t
0
R21(eg1τ , 1)dτ
t
,
whereR21(x1, x2) = −x1U21(x1, x2)/U2(x1, x2) is the relative correlation aver-
sion, i.e., the elasticity of the marginal utility of the environment with respect
to consumption. Intuitively, if this elasticity is decreasing with time, the sub-
stitution effect is decreasing with the time horizon. If g1 is positive, this is
the case if R21 is decreasing in its first argument. Under specification (5), it
is easy to check that
R21(x1, x2) =
µ
α− 1
σ
¶
(1− γ∗(x1/x2)). (7)
with
γ∗(x) =
γ
(1− γ)xσ−1σ + γ
.
Therefore, R21 are decreasing with x1 if (ασ − 1)(1 − σ) is positive. The
substitution effect is diminishing over time in that case. This provides an
intuition for property 3. This is reminiscent of Gollier (2002) who linked
decreasing relative risk aversion to the decreasing nature of the term structure
of the economic discount rate.2
6 Lognormal distributions
Introducing uncertainty into this model under the CES specification (5) is
difficult because there is in general no analytical expression to the expectation
of U2(x1t, x2t), except when σ tends to unity. When σ tends to unity, y tends
to x1−γ1 x
γ
2 , and U tends to a Cobb-Douglas specification:
U(x1, x2) = kx
1−γ1
1 x
1−γ2
2 , (8)
2Under the same conditions, we have that r1(t) = δ + g1t−1
R t
0
R11(eg1τ , 1)dτ. This
implies that r1 is decreasing if and only if relative risk aversion is decreasing (Gollier
(2002)). The main result in Guesnerie (2004) is a special case of this observation.
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with 1− γ1 = (1− γ)(1− α) and 1− γ2 = γ(1− α). The monotonicity of U
with respect to x1 and x2 requires that
sgn(1− γ1) = sgn(1− γ2) = sgn(k).
The concavity of U with respect to x1 and x2 implies that γ1 and γ2 must be
positive. If we assume that γ1 and γ2 are both larger than unity, it is easy
to check that the representative agent considers pairs of harms as mutually
aggravating, implying correlation aversion and (cross-)prudence.
We consider four different specifications for the dynamics of (x1t, x2t).
6.1 A bivariate brownian motion with Cobb-Douglas
preferences
In the first one, we suppose that this pair follows a bivariate geometric brown-
ian motion. It implies that for all t, (lnx1t, lnx2t) is jointly normally distrib-
uted with mean (lnx10 + μ1t, lnx20 + μ2t) and variance-covariance matrix
Σ = (σijt)i,j=1,2. The proof of the following propositions are relegated to the
Appendix.
Proposition 6 Suppose that U(x1, x2) = kx
1−γ1
1 x
1−γ2
2 and that (x1t, x2t) fol-
lows a bivariate geometric Brownian motion. It implies that the ecological
discount rate equals
r2(t) = δ+γ2
∙
g2 −
1
2
(γ2 + 1)σ22
¸
+(γ1−1)
∙
g1 −
1
2
γ1σ11
¸
−(γ1−1)γ2σ12, (9)
where σij = t−1cov(xit, xjt) and gi = t−1 lnExit/xi0 = μi + 0.5σii.
Symmetrically, the economic discount rate equals
r1(t) = δ + γ1
∙
g1 −
1
2
(γ1 + 1)σ11
¸
+ (γ2 − 1)
∙
g2 −
1
2
γ2σ22
¸
− (γ2 − 1)γ1σ12.
(10)
These formulas extend the Ramsey rule to an ecological economy. The dif-
ferent terms in the right-hand side of equation (9) are easily linked to the five
determinants of the ecological discount rate that we obtained in the previous
section:
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• γ2g2 is the ecological growth effect;
• −1
2
γ2(γ2 + 1)σ22 is the ecological prudence effect;
• (γ1 − 1)g1 is the substitution effect;
• −1
2
(γ1 − 1)γ2σ22 is the cross-prudence effect;
• −(γ1 − 1)γ2σ12 is correlation effect.
An important implication of this proposition is that the term structures
of the economic discount rates and of the ecological discount rates are flat.
In such an economy, the random evolution of aggregate consumption and of
the environmental quality does not justify to use a smaller rate to discount
benefits occurring in a more distant future.
Another immediate consequence of Proposition 6 is that
r2 − r1 = (g2 − g1) + (γ1σ11 − γ2σ22) + (γ2 − γ1)σ12. (11)
Interestingly enough, under certainty, the difference between the two dis-
count rates is independent of the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas utility
function. This equation provides two arguments in favor of using an ecolog-
ical discount rate smaller than the economic discount rate. First, it is often
suggested that the growth rate of environmental quality is smaller than the
economic growth rate (g2 ≤ g1), the first being potentially negative. Second,
it seems that there is much more uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the
environmental quality than the evolution of the economy itself (σ22 ≥ σ11).
If the degrees aversion to risk on x1 and on x2 are not too heterogeneous, this
would imply that γ2σ22 − γ1σ11 be positive. The last term of the right-hand
side of equation (11) is more difficult to sign.
6.2 A single brownian motion with Cobb-Douglas pref-
erences
Because of the lack of time-series data about environmental quality, calibrat-
ing this specification is problematic. Various authors have argued in favor of
a closer link between the environmental quality and economic growth than
the one that we assumed in Proposition 6. Following this idea, let us alter-
natively assume that the environmental quality is a deterministic function
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of economic achievement: x2 = f(x1). Common wisdom suggests that the
environmental quality is a decreasing function of GDP per capita, but this
is heavily debated in scientific circles. The environmental Kuznets curve hy-
pothesizes that the relationship between per capita income and the environ-
mental quality has an inverted U-shape, but there is no consensus about it
(see for example Millimet, List and Stengos (2003)). We hereafter hypothe-
size a monotone relationship by assuming that there exists ρ ∈ R such that
x2 = x
ρ
1, where ρ can be either positive or negative. If we assume that x1
follows a geometric brownian motion, we obtain an analytical solution for r1
and r2.
Proposition 7 Suppose that U(x1, x2) = kx
1−γ1
1 x
1−γ2
2 , that x2 = x
ρ
1 and
that x1t follows a geometric brownian motion. It implies that the ecological
discount rate equals
r2(t) = δ + (ργ2 + γ1 − 1) [g1 − 0.5(ργ2 + γ1)σ11] , (12)
where g1 = t−1 lnEx1t/x10 and σ11 = t−1V ar(x1t).
Symmetrically, the economic discount rate equals
r1(t) = δ + (γ1 + ρ(γ2 − 1)) [g1 − 0.5(1 + γ1 + ρ(γ2 − 1))σ11] . (13)
In order to calibrate this model, let us assume that the rate of pure
preference for the present δ is zero. We also assume that the relative aversion
to risk on consumption is a constant γ1 = 2, which is often considered as a
reasonable estimation.3 The parameter γ2 of aversion to environmental risk
is not easy to calibrate. Observe however that
γ∗ =
γ2 − 1
γ1 + γ2 − 2
is the share of total consumption expenditures that the representative agent
would use on environmental quality if environmental quality would be a
tradable good.4 Hoel and Sterner (2007) and Sterner and Persson (2008)
suggested γ∗ somewhere 10% and 50%, which implies that γ2 should be
3See Dre`ze (1981) for example.
4Because the price elasticity equals −1 under this specification, this share remains
constant over time.
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somewhere between 1.1 and 2 under our specification. We hereafter assume
γ∗ = 30%, which implies γ2 = 1.4.
Kocherlakota (1996) estimated the parameters of the growth process of
consumption in the United States with yearly data between 1889 and 1978.
He obtained g1 = 1.8% and σ
1/2
11 = 3.6%. The choice of ρ depends upon how
we define the environmental quality. In order to estimate ρ, we considered
the SYS LAN indicator contained in the Environmental Sustainability Index
(ESI2005, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, (2005)), which
measures for 146 countries in 2005 the percentage of total land area (including
inland waters) having very high anthropogenic impact. The OLS estimation
of the regression coefficients are as follows:
lnx2 = 1.93− 0.10 lnx1 + ε
where x1 is the country’s GDP/cap5 whereas x2 is 3 plus the country’s
SYS LAN indicator contained in ESI2005. The p-value for the slope-coefficient
is -4.69, whereas the R2 coefficient equals 0.13. Plugging ρ = −0.10 in equa-
tions (12) and (13) yields r2 = 1.5% and r1 = 3.2%. It is useful to provide a
few comments on this result:
• The difference bteween the ecological rate and the economic rate comes
mostly from the large expected economic growth rate (g1 = 1.8%)
compared to the expected environmental growth rate (g2 = ρg1 =
−0.18%).
• The elevel of the ecological rate is mostly determined by the substitu-
tion effect. Because ρ is small in absolute value, the (negative) ecolog-
ical growth effect γ2ρg1 = −0.25% is indeed small. This needs to be
compared to the substitution effect (γ1 − 1)g1 = 1.8%.
• The effect of the uncertainty (prudence, cross-prudence and correlation
effects) is marginal because of the low volatility of x1 and x2, and
because we assume that shocks are not serially correlated.
6.3 A single brownian motion with CES preferences
In the numerical illustration presented above, we assumed that the elasticity
of substitution σ equals unity. In Figure 1, we describe the term structure of
5We used data from the World Economic Outlook Database of IMF, April 2008.
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the ecological discount rates when the constant elasticity of substitution σ is
either 0.5, 1, or 1.5. We use the CES specification (5) with γ = 2/7, α = 2.4.
When σ tends to unity, this is equivalent to the Cobb-Douglas specification
(8) with γ1 = 2 and γ2 = 1.4, as in the above numerical illustration. We also
assume that lnx1t follows an arithmetic brownian motion with the same trend
and volatility, and that x2t = x
ρ
1t with the same ρ = −0.1. When σ = 1, we
know from above that the ecological discount rate is a flat 1.5%, independent
of the time horizon. As can be seen from (7), the relative correlation aversion
R21(1, 1) = −U21(1, 1)/U2(1, 1) measured at t = 0 (where we normalized
x10 = x20 = 1) is increasing in the elasticity of substitution σ. It implies that
the crucial substitution effect — which tends to raise the ecological discount
rate — is made more powerful by an increase in σ. This explains the relative
position of the three plain curves in Figure 1, at least for small t. When
σ = 1.5, equation (7) tells us that the substitution effect is increasing with
time, because of the increased scarcity of the environment. This explains the
positive slope of r2 in that case. The effect is reversed for σ = 0.5.
The dashed curves in Figure 1 are obtained by ignoring the three effects
associated to uncertainty (σ11 = 0), in which case equation (6) may be ap-
plied. The comparison with the corresponding plain curves tells us that the
effect of uncertainty is globally negative. This is because the third derivatives
of U are negative under the specifications under scrutiny.
6.4 Parametric uncertainty
In the last specification for the dynamics of (x1t, x2t), we introduce some
parametric uncertainty. Conditional to parameter θ, x1t follows a geometric
Brownian motion with drift g1(θ) and volatility σ
1/2
11 (θ), whereas x2 = x
ρ(θ)
1 .
In this case, we obtain the following proposition. The true value of θ is un-
known, and the prior beliefs on it is described by the cumulative distribution
function F .
Proposition 8 Suppose that U(x1, x2) = kx
1−γ1
1 x
1−γ2
2 , that x2 = x
ρ
1 and x1t
follows a geometric brownian motion. Suppose that the true value of triplet
(g1, σ11, ρ) is uncertain at date 0 so that it depends upon some parameter θ
whose cumulative distribution function is F . It implies that the ecological
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Figure 1: The term structure of the ecological discount rate (in %) under
specification (5) with α = 2.4 and γ = 2/7. We assume that lnx1t follows a
brownian motion with trend 1.8% and volatility 3.6% (plain curves) or 0%
(dashed curves), and that x2t = x−0.11t .
discount rate equals
r2(t) = δ −
1
t
ln
Z
exp[−R2(θ)t]dF (θ), (14)
where R2(θ) = (ργ2 + γ1 − 1)[g1 − 0.5(ργ2 + γ1)σ11].
Symmetrically, the economic discount rate equals
r1(t) = δ −
1
t
ln
Z
exp[−R1(θ)t]dF (θ), (15)
where R1(θ) = (γ1 + ρ(γ2 − 1)) [g1 − 0.5(1 + γ1 + ρ(γ2 − 1))σ11]. By Jensen
inequality, this immediately implies that the term structures of r1 and r2 are
decreasing. The short-term discount rate ri(t) equals δ plus the mean of Ri
when t tends to zero, and it tends to δ plus the smallest possible value of
Ri(θ) when t tends to infinity. The reason for the decreasing nature of the
term structure comes from the combination of two properties of this speci-
fication. First, the parametric uncertainty raises the long term uncertainty
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Figure 2: The term structures of the economic and ecological discount rates
(in %), assuming δ = 0, γ = 2, γ2 = 1.4, g1 = 1.8%, σ
1/2
11 = 3.6% and
ρ ∼ (−0.6, 1/2; 0.4, 1/2).
surrounding (x1t, x2t) relatively more for the long term than for the short
term. Second, because the representative agent is prudent, cross-prudent
and correlation-averse, Propositions 2, 3 and 4 implies that these (negative)
effects will be increasing (in absolute value) with time.
These results generalize those obtained by Weitzman (2007) and Gol-
lier (2007) to multiattribute utility functions. They both assumed that the
economic growth rate was affected by parametric uncertainty. Suppose al-
ternatively that g1 and σ11 are known, but the elasticity ρ of environmental
quality to changes in GDP is not. Rather than assuming that ρ = −0.1 as
above, let us suppose that ρ is either −0.6 or +0.4 with equal probabilities.
All other parameters remain unchanged compared to section 6.2. We draw
the term structure of r1 and r2 in Figure 2. Whereas the economic discount
rate is almost independent of time horizon, the ecological discount rate goes
from 1.4% to 0.3% when t goes from 0 to infinity. The high uncertainty affect-
ing the long-term evolution of the environment in this specification explains
why the term structure of the ecological discount rate is decreasing.
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7 Conclusion
Environmentalists are often quite skeptical about using standard cost-benefit
analysis to shape environmental policies because environmental damages in-
curred in the distant future are claimed to receive insufficient weights in the
economic evaluation. This may be due either because future environmental
assets are undervalued, or because the economic discount rate is too large.
In this paper, we address these two questions altogether by defining an eco-
logical discount rate compatible with social welfare when the representative
agent cares about both the economic and ecological environment faced by
future generations. This ecological rate at which future environmental dam-
ages are discounted may be much smaller than the economic rate at which
economic damages are discounted, because of the integration of the poten-
tially increasing willingness to pay for the environment into the ecological
discount rate. We have also shown in this paper that the uncertainties sur-
rounding the evolutions of the environment and the economy tend to reduce
the discount rates, in particular if they are positively correlated.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 6
Under the specification of this proposition, we can rewrite EU2(x1t, x2t)
as
EU2(x1t, x2t) = k(1− γ2)E [exp zt] ,
where zt = (1− γ1) lnx1t − γ2 lnx2t is normally distributed with mean
Ezt = (1− γ1)(lnx10 + μ1t)− γ2(lnx20 + μ2t)
and variance
V ar(zt) =
¡
(1− γ1)2σ11 + γ22σ22 − 2(1− γ1)γ2σ12
¢
t.
As is well-known, the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact for an exponential
utility function with a normally distributed random variable. It implies that
EU2(x1t, x2t) = k(1− γ2)E [exp zt] = k(1− γ2) exp (Ezt + 0.5V ar(zt)) .
This implies in turn that
EU2(x1t, x2t)
U2(x10, x20)
= exp ((1− γ1)g1 − γ2g2 + 0.5 (γ1(γ1 − 1)σ11 + γ2(γ2 + 1)σ22 − 2(1− γ1)γ2σ12)) t,
where gi is the expected growth rate of xit: Exit = xi0egit.6 Applying (4)
concludes this proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7
We can rewrite U2(x1, x2) = kη−γ2(1 − γ2)x1−γ1−ργ21 , which implies that
EU2(x1t, x2t) be proportional to E exp [(1− γ1 − ργ2) lnx1t] . Again, since the
Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact for an exponential utility function with
a normally distributed random variable, we have that
EU2(x1t, x2t)
U2(x10, x20)
= exp ((1− γ1 − ργ2)(μ1t+ 0.5(1− γ1 − ργ2)σ11t) , (16)
6Using Ito’s Lemma or the property that the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact in
this framework yields that gi = μi + 0.5σii.
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with μ1 = t−1E ln(x1t/x10) = g1− 0.5σ11. Applying (4) concludes this proof.
A symmetric analysis can be made for r1(t), after noticing that U1(x1, x2) =
kη1−γ2(1− γ1)x−γ1−ρ(γ2−1)1 . ¥
Proof of Proposition 8
We limit the proof to r2(t). Conditional to θ, equation (16) holds, which
implies that
EU2(x1t, x2t)
U2(x10, x20)
=
Z
exp [−R2(θ)t] dF (θ).
Applying (4) concludes this proof. ¥
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